

## **GOVT 491: International Environmental Policy**

Spring 2012

Thursdays 3:30-6:50

Morton 37

Professor: Mark T. Buntaine

Office Hours: Wednesday 10-12 and Thursday 1:30-3 (Morton 13)

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### **Overview**

International environmental issues are among the most intractable problems facing the global community. Collective action problems plague negotiations and mechanisms to ensure compliance with international environmental agreements are often weak. Despite these constraints, international actors have been successful at putting certain policy mechanisms into place that aim to improve transboundary environmental resources. The purpose of this seminar is to move beyond a general approach to global environmental governance and examine the reasons why specific international policy mechanism and institutions have or have not been effective. We will gather and apply insights from international relations, international political economy, development economics, and public policy. In each session, we will review specific international environmental policies and evaluate the latest research about their effectiveness. By doing so, we will identify knowledge gaps that impede our understanding about the role different international environmental policies and institutions might play in addressing transboundary resources issues.

### **Student Evaluation**

Discussion Paper #1	15%
Discussion Paper #2	15%
Seminar Participation	20%
Final Paper	40%
Final Presentation	10%

#### *Discussion Papers (15% each)*

Every student will be responsible for completing two short papers about the readings of a particular week. These papers should discuss the sources of (in)effectiveness in implementing the type of international policy that we are discussing for the session, any conclusions that can be reached about the impact of the policy on environmental conditions, and further research/policy questions that are not addressed by the readings. The paper should be about two single-spaced pages. The goal of the discussion paper is not to summarize the readings, but rather to synthesize what we know and do not know about the effectiveness of a particular policy. You should pay particular attention to theoretical and conceptual issues raised by the readings that might be applied more broadly. The discussion paper should be posted to Blackboard 48 hours *before* the relevant meeting. At the beginning of each meeting, the writers of the discussion papers will spend five minutes presenting their paper and then start the discussion with a question that they raise in their paper.

### *Seminar Participation (20%)*

The course will be run like a graduate-level seminar, complete with the high expectations that come with it. I expect you to attend all seminar meetings and to be ready to discuss all of the assigned readings. This means that you will have actively taken notes on the assigned readings, identified important questions raised by the readings, and formed an initial idea about how you would design research to address unresolved issues found in the readings. It is extremely important that you prepare prior to meetings, since we will spend a portion of each meeting brainstorming ideas for improving research on the effectiveness of the policy that we are covering.

### *Final Paper and Presentation (40% / 10%)*

Every student will write a 20 to 25-page research paper as part of this course about an international environmental policy. This paper should review what is known about the effectiveness of an international environmental policy *and* analyze primary data to increase our knowledge about the conditions that contribute to policy effectiveness. You can choose to analyze either qualitative or quantitative data, but your research design should adhere to scientific standards.

During the last two sessions of the semester, we will have a mini-conference where each student will present the research they have conducted during the semester. Like a typical professional conference, every presentation will be 12 minutes long, with approximately 10 minutes of question and answer. In addition to presenting research, each student will serve as a discussant for one other research project. The discussant should offer a 2-3 minute evaluation of the project and suggestions for improving the final write-up.

### **Contacting Me**

I encourage you to come talk to me about the course and your research project during my office hours or by making an appointment. In addition to class time and office hours, I endeavor to be accessible to you by email, but I am not always online. In general, I will try to respond to any email that I receive within 24 hours (48 hours over the weekend). That means that you should not wait until the last minute to ask questions about assignments. In some cases, I may suggest that we meet face to face to discuss issues that are difficult to address in an email.

### **Academic Honesty**

It is my expectation that you will adhere to the highest standards of academic honesty. This means only turning in work that is your own and properly citing all information and ideas that you draw from others. For more information on citation requirements in general, visit this very good set of library guides, borrowed from Duke University: <http://library.duke.edu/research/plagiarism/>

I will assign a failing grade for assignments that do not have proper citations. For overt plagiarism and other cases of academic dishonesty, I will refer the case to the Dean of Students. That being said, I encourage you to work together as groups to find, organize, and analyze the data for your projects. While every person is required to turn in their own literature review and data exercises, helping each other through the challenges involved with research will benefit everyone.

## **January 19. Course Introduction and Evaluating Effectiveness**

- Young, O. 2001. Inferences and Indices: Evaluating the Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes. *Global Environmental Politics* 1(1): 99-121.
- Mitchell, Ronald B. 2008. "Evaluating the Performance of Environmental Institutions: What to Evaluate and How to Evaluate It?" In *Institutions and Environmental Change: Principal Findings, Applications, and Research Frontiers*, edited by Oran R. Young, Leslie A. King and Heike Schroeder, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 79-114.

## **January 26 (NEED TO RESCHEDULE). Clean Development Mechanism and Local Sustainable Development**

- Sutter, C., & Parreño, J. (2007). Does the Current Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Deliver Its Sustainable Development Claim? An Analysis of Officially Registered CDM Projects. *Climatic Change*, 84(1), 75-90.
- Dechezleprêtre, A., Glachant, M., & Ménière, Y. (2008). The Clean Development Mechanism and the International Diffusion of Technologies: An Empirical Study. *Energy Policy*, 36(4), 1273-1283.
- Adrian, M. (2007). How to Make the Clean Development Mechanism Sustainable - the Potential of Rent Extraction. *Energy Policy*, 35(6), 3203-3212.
- Pearson, B. (2006). Market Failure: Why the Clean Development Mechanism Won't Promote Clean Development. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 15(2): 247-252.
- Lövbrand, E., Rindeljäll, T., & Nordqvist, J. (2009). Closing the Legitimacy Gap in Global Environmental Governance? Lessons from the Emerging CDM Market. *Global Environmental Politics*, 9(2), 74-100.
- Hultman, N. E., Pulver, S., Guimarães, L., Deshmukh, R., & Kane, J. (forthcoming). Carbon Market Risks and Rewards: Firm Perceptions of CDM Investment Decisions in Brazil and India. *Energy Policy*, 40: 90-102.

## **February 2. International Carbon Markets**

- Christiansen, A. C., Wettstad, Jorgen. (2003). The EU as a Frontrunner on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading: How Did It Happen and Will the EU Succeed? *Climate Policy*, 3(1), 3-18. [Blackboard]
- Convery, F. J. (2009). Reflections—the Emerging Literature on Emissions Trading in Europe. *Review of Environmental Economics and Policy*, 3(1), 121-137.
- Ellerman, A., & Buchner, B. (2008). Over-Allocation or Abatement? A Preliminary Analysis of the EU ETS Based on the 2005–06 Emissions Data. *Environmental and Resource Economics*, 41(2), 267-287.
- Grubb, M., & Neuhoﬀ, K. (2006). Allocation and Competitiveness in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme: Policy Overview. *Climate Policy*, 6(1), 7-30. [Blackboard]
- Fankhauser, S. (2011). Carbon Trading: A Good Idea is Going through a Bad Patch. *European Financial Review*, April/May, p. 32-35. [Blackboard]

## **February 9. International Ozone Policy: The Montreal Protocol**

- Parson, E. (2003). *Protecting the Ozone Layer: Science and Strategy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chapters 1 & 9. [Blackboard]

- Wettestad, J. 2001. The Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol on Ozone-Layer Depletion. In *Environmental Regime Effectiveness: Confronting Theory with Evidence*, edited by Miles, E.L., et al. Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 149-172. [Blackboard]
- DeSombre, E.R. and Kauffman, J. 1996. The Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund: A Partial Success Story. In *Institutions for Environmental Aid: Pitfalls and Promise*, edited by Keohane, R.O. and Levy, M.A. Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 89-126. [Blackboard]
- Velders, G. J. M., Andersen, S. O., Daniel, J. S., Fahey, D. W., & McFarland, M. (2007). The Importance of the Montreal Protocol in Protecting Climate. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 104(12), 4814-4819.

### **February 16. International NGO Conservation Programs**

- Agrawal, A., & Redford, K. (2009). Conservation and Displacement: An Overview. *Conservation & Society*, 7(1), 1-10.
- Meyer, C. A. (1995). Opportunism and NGOs: Entrepreneurship and Green North-South Transfers. *World Development*, 23(8), 1277-1289.
- Michael, E. (1999). NGO Performance - What Breeds Success? New Evidence from South Asia. *World Development*, 27(2), 361-374.
- Brooks, T. M., Wright, S. J., & Sheil, D. (2009). Evaluating the Success of Conservation Actions in Safeguarding Tropical Forest Biodiversity. *Conservation Biology*, 23(6), 1448-1457.
- Ferraro, P. J., & Pattanayak, S. K. (2006). Money for Nothing? A Call for Empirical Evaluation of Biodiversity Conservation Investments. *PLoS Biol*, 4(4), e105.
- Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink (1998). "Environmental Advocacy Networks." In Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*, 121-165.

### **February 23. Private Certification Schemes: the Case of Forestry**

- Cashore, B., Auld, G. & Newsom, D. (2004). *Governing Through Markets: Forest Certification and the Emergence of Non-State Authority*. New Haven: Yale University Press, Chs. 1 & 3. [Blackboard]
- Gullison, R. E. (2003). Does Forest Certification Conserve Biodiversity? *Oryx*, 37(02), 153-165.
- Ebeling, J., & Yasué, M. (2009). The Effectiveness of Market-Based Conservation in the Tropics: Forest Certification in Ecuador and Bolivia. *Journal of Environmental Management*, 90(2), 1145-1153.
- Bartley, T. (2010). Transnational Private Regulation in Practice: The Limits of Forest and Labor Standards Certification in Indonesia. *Business and Politics*, 12(3), Article 7.

### **March 1. Transboundary River Management**

- Conca, K., Wu, F.S., and Neukirchen, J. (2006). Swimming Upstream: In Search of a Global Regime for International Rivers. In Conca, K., *Governing Water: Contentious Transnational Politics and Global Institution Building*. Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 93-122. [Blackboard]
- Berardo, R., & Gerlak, A. K. (2012). Conflict and Cooperation Along International Rivers: Crafting a Model of Institutional Effectiveness. *Global Environmental Politics*, 12(1), 101-120.

- Dombrowsky, I. (2008). Institutional Design and Regime Effectiveness in Transboundary River Management? The Elbe Water Quality Regime. *Hydrology and Earth System Sciences*, 12(1), 223-238.
- Backer, E. B. (2007). The Mekong River Commission: Does It Work, and How Does the Mekong Basin's Geography Influence Its Effectiveness? *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 4, 31-55. [Blackboard]
- Bernauer, T. (2002). Explaining Success and Failure in International River Management. *Aquatic Sciences*, 64, 1-19.

### **March 8. Spring Break – NO CLASS**

### **March 15. Environmental Assistance: Policies and Programs**

- Connolly, B. (1996). Increments for the Earth: the politics of environmental aid. In: R. Keohane and M.A. Levy, eds. *Institutions for environmental aid*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. [Blackboard]
- VanDeveer, S. D., & Dabelko, G. D. (2001). It's Capacity, Stupid: International Assistance and National Implementation. *Global Environmental Politics*, 1(2), 18-29.
- Independent Evaluation Group [IEG]. (2008). [\*Environmental Sustainability: An Evaluation of World Bank Group Support\*](#). Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Buntaine, M.T. & Parks, B.C. (2012). When Do Environmentally-Focused Aid Projects Achieve their Objectives? Evidence from World Bank Post-Project Evaluations. Working Paper.

**Due:** Detailed outline of research paper, including a full literature review and an outline of the data that you will use.

### **March 22. Environmental Assistance: International Organizations**

- Buntaine, M.B. 2011. *Responding to Environmental Performance: The Politics of Selectivity at the Multilateral Development Banks*. Working Book Manuscript.
- Clemencon, R. (2006). What Future for the Global Environment Facility? *The Journal of Environment & Development*, 15(1), 50-74.
- Ivanova, M. (2010). UNEP in Global Environmental Governance: Design, Leadership, Location. *Global Environmental Politics*, 10(1), 30-59.
- Heggelund, G., Andresen, S., & Ying, S. (2005). Performance of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) in China: Achievements and Challenges as Seen by the Chinese. *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics*, 5(3), 323-348.

### **April 5. Trade Agreements and the Environment**

- Neumayer, E. (2004). The WTO and the Environment: Its Past Record Is Better Than Critics Believe, but the Future Outlook Is Bleak. *Global Environmental Politics*, 4(3), 1-8.
- Gabler, M. (2010). Norms, Institutions and Social Learning: An Explanation for Weak Policy Integration in the WTO's Committee on Trade and Environment. *Global Environmental Politics*, 10(2), 80-117.
- Fox, A. B. (1995). Environment and Trade: The NAFTA Case. *Political Science Quarterly*, 110(1), 49-

68.

Ferretti, J. (2002). NAFTA and the Environment: An Update. *Canada-United States Law Journal*, 28, 81.

Fernandez, L., & Das, M. (2011). Trade Transport and Environment Linkages at the U.S.–Mexico Border: Which Policies Matter? *Journal of Environmental Management*, 92(3), 508-521.

#### **April 12. Emerging Financing Mechanisms: Climate Investment Funds / Green Climate Fund**

Prins, G., & Rayner, S. (2007). Time to Ditch Kyoto. *Nature*, 449(7165), 973-975.

Olmstead, S. M., & Stavins, R. N. (2006). An International Policy Architecture for the Post-Kyoto Era. *The American Economic Review*, 96(2), 35-38.

van Kerkhoff, L., Ahmad, I. H., Pittock, J., & Steffen, W. (2011). Designing the Green Climate Fund: How to Spend \$100 Billion Sensibly. *Environment*, 53(3), 18-31.

Ayers, J. M., & Huq, S. (2009). Supporting Adaptation to Climate Change: What Role for Official Development Assistance? *Development Policy Review*, 27(6), 675-692.

Sierra, K. (2011). [\*The Green Climate Fund: Options for Mobilizing the Private Sector\*](#). Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.

**Due:** Draft of your paper is due to your paper discussant, who will provide both written and oral comments.

#### **April 19/26: Research Project Mini-Conference**

**Due:** Final papers are due May 4 at noon.